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Towards an Equitable Review of Pre-Embryo and
Divorce Disputes for Women
Lilah Kleban*
ABSTRACT
Pre-embryos, procured through in-vitro fertilization (IVF), become a source of
dispute when couples divorce or separate before using them. Particularly, couples may
fight over who has decision-making power to use or not use the frozen pre-embryos for
pregnancy. State courts across jurisdictions typically apply one of three categorical
approaches: disposition contracts, contemporaneous mutual consent, or a balancing
interests test. Each approach fails to provide courts with structures to fully evaluate each
party’s interests at the time of dispute and account for inherent sex and gender differences
that impact their stakes in the dispute. This Note proposes a modified balancing test that
accounts for couples’ changing interests over time and provides defined balancing factors
to ensure commensurate weight for sex and gender differences between parties.
Keywords: in-vitro fertilization (IVF), disposition contract, contemporaneous mutual
consent, balancing test, sex differences, gender differences, divorce
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INTRODUCTION
Mary Sue and Junior Davis married in 1980 and underwent extraordinary measures
to try to become parents.1 Mary Sue had painful tubal pregnancies and fallopian tube
ligation, a failed adoption attempt, other prohibitively expensive adoption options, and five
rounds of unsuccessful in-vitro fertilization (IVF).2 Finally, the couple chose to do one
more round of IVF, this time with cryopreservation, which allowed them to freeze extra
un-implanted embryos, or pre-embryos, for later use.3 However, before using the remaining
pre-embryos, Junior Davis filed for divorce, leaving the future of those cryopreserved preembryos unknown.4 Mary Sue wanted to use the pre-embryos, initially to become pregnant
herself, and later to donate to another couple, while Junior wanted to destroy the preembryos.5
In Davis v. Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court became the first to address the status
of frozen pre-embryos in the wake of divorce.6 The court ruled in favor of Junior, holding
that his interest in avoiding parenthood outweighed Mary Sue’s interest in using the preembryos,7 but this case set the stage for a slew of legal questions across state jurisdictions.
Who owns frozen pre-embryos? Are they in fact property that a party can have an interest
in and a right to possess? Are they incipient children subjecting the parties to potential
parenthood? Can one party use pre-embryos without the other’s consent? Can they use the
pre-embryos to become pregnant? To donate to a third party? Can the pre-embryos be
destroyed without the consent of one party? There is also a question of changing interests.
If a court recognizes a predisposition agreement—a contract made at the outset of IVF
procedures about what to do with cryopreserved pre-embryos if circumstances change—
should the court also consider whether the interests from the time of agreement to the
present have significantly changed?
The question of what to do with frozen pre-embryos in divorce is increasingly
important. With divorce rates high8 and the availability of long-term cryopreservation,9
1

Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tenn. 1992), on reh'g in part, No. 34, 1992 WL 341632 (Tenn.
Nov. 23, 1992).
2
Id. at 591–92.
3
Id. at 592.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 590.
6
Id. at 589.
7
Id. at 604.
8
In 2019, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported 2,015,603 marriages, at a rate of
6.1 per 1,000 of the total population in the United States. By contrast, the CDC, pooling from 45 States and
D.C., reported 746,971 divorces and annulments, at rate of 2.7 per 1,000 of the total population of the
reporting states. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE RATE
TRENDS (2021), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/national-marriage-divorce-rates-00-19.pdf.
9
Mindy Christianson, M.D., Freezing Embryos, JOHNS HOPKINS MED.,
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/treatment-tests-and-therapies/freezingembryos#:~:text=Frozen%20embryos%20are%20stored%20and,10%20years%20and%20even%20longer
(last visited Apr. 23, 2022) (pre-embryos can be cryopreserved for 10 years); Priscila Melantonio, Jessica
Attivo, Alecsandra P. Gomes, Tatiana C.S. Bonetti, & Pedro A.A. Monteleone, Delivering Embryos
Following 10 Years of Cryopreservation, Using Unpaired Freeze/Thaw Techniques: A Case Report, 25(4)
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there is a reasonable chance couples will divorce or separate while unused pre-embryos
remain frozen in storage. It is therefore imperative to review how courts approach this
question and consider the practicability of a bright-line rule to resolve such disputes.
Since the Davis decision, state courts have employed three primary categorical
analyses to resolve IVF disputes in divorce: disposition contracts for frozen pre-embryos,
contemporaneous mutual consent, and a balancing test to weigh each parties’ interests
against the other.10 However, these approaches allow courts to overlook important interests
they should recognize and account for in resolving IVF disputes: the nature of pre-embryos,
changing interests over time, and the implications of sex and gender on IVF.
This Note draws from several frameworks provided by the Davis court, including the
nature of IVF and divorce disputes and the nature of pre-embryos. Similar to the Davis
decision and most existing caselaw surrounding IVF and divorce disputes, I focus on
scenarios where one party wants to use frozen pre-embryos over the other’s objection.11
Additionally, the Davis court applied a presumption that pre-embryos are neither property
nor children, thus not governed by existing property or family law and warranting special
attention.12 Accordingly, I apply the presumption that pre-embryos occupy a status of
quasi-personhood and quasi-property as an acknowledgement of their unique nature and
value.
When Mary Sue wanted to use pre-embryos for pregnancy, the pre-embryos
represented potential children.13 By contrast, for Junior, who did not want the pre-embryos
to be used for pregnancy, they may have represented “forced parenthood”14 or emotional
discomfort. A “quasi” distinction allows recognition that pre-embryos are created
intentionally for procreation and hold personal value beyond marital property, such as

JBRA ASSISTED REPROD., 644–46 (2021) (case report documenting successful pregnancy for 10-year
cryopreserved pre-embryo); Donna Dowling-Lacey, M.S., Jacob F. Mayer, Ph.D., Estella Jones, M.S.,
Silvina Bocca, M.D., Ph.D., Laurel Stadtmauer, M.D., Ph.D., & Sergio Oehninger, M.D., Ph.D., Live Birth
from a Frozen–Thawed Pronuclear Stage Embryo Almost 20 Years After its Cryopreservation, 95(3)
FERTILITY & STERILITY, 1120.e1–1120.e3 (Mar. 1, 2011) (case report documenting successful live birth for
19-year cryopreserved pre-embryo).
10
See Reber v. Reiss, 2012 PA Super 86, 42 A.3d 1131, 1131 (2012).
11
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), on reh'g in part, No. 34, 1992 WL 341632 (Tenn.
Nov. 23, 1992); see Reber, 42 A.3d 1131; Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2015);
see A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
12
Categorizing pre-embryos as quasi-personhood and quasi-property stems from the Davis court findings.
The court in Davis based their categorization of pre-embryos on The American Fertility Society’s ethical
standards, outlining “special respect” needed to protect pre-embryos’ potential to become a person, without
affording treatment as a person, because pre-embryos are not people and “may never realize [their] biologic
potential.” Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596 (citing Report of the Ethics Committee of The American Fertility
Society, 53 J. AM. FERTILITY SOC’Y, 34S, 34S–35S (June 1990)). Accordingly, the Davis court concluded
that “preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim category
that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life.” Id.
13
See id. at 604 (“Refusal to permit donation of the preembryos would impose on [Mary Sue] the burden of
knowing that the lengthy IVF procedures she underwent were futile, and that the preembryos to which she
contributed genetic material would never become children”).
14
See Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of "Coerced Parenthood" in Frozen Embryo
Disputes, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1021, 1060 (2004).
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furniture subject to distribution upon divorce.15 Nevertheless, the connection between
potential parents and pre-embryos does not inherently give rise to a parent–child
relationship. This “quasi” nature merely signals to courts the need to give these disputes
special attention: pre-embryos may simply be a collection of cells, but using or destroying
them holds the potential to change someone’s world.
Since pre-embryos are quasi in nature and determine whether someone can get
pregnant or become a parent, courts should not apply rigid rules that ignore changing
circumstances and human indecisiveness. Instead, they should allow people to change their
minds. For Mary Sue, the IVF dispute first represented whether she could become
pregnant, and later represented whether her invasive medical procedures were for naught.16
For Junior, they represented whether his ex-wife would use his sperm to create a baby
without his present consent.17 With such high stakes, it is worth considering whether
predictable contracting for pre-embryos is the right approach. Instead of applying rigid
rules, parties are entitled to good-faith fluctuation in their decisions. Variability and
fluctuation are part of the reason I argue private parties, particularly women, should make
their own reproductive decisions about pre-embryos. While writing this Note, the Supreme
Court issued Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., overruling Roe v. Wade and the
constitutional right to abortion for pre-viability fetuses.18 Abortion is a distinct
reproductive issue from IVF. However, in failing to clarify whether conception starts in a
womb or a lab, Dobbs blurs whether couples have reproductive autonomy to decide the
fate of their frozen pre-embryos.19
While Dobbs does not substantively change my argument, it touches on similar
themes. Writing for the majority, Justice Alito argued, in part, that variability in factors
impacting whether a fetus is considered “viable” is reason to overrule Roe.20 IVF disputes
present a similar arena for this argument. Because there are too many complicated factors
to evaluate, because medical and legal professionals could evaluate interests differently,
and because parties’ dispositions fluctuate, courts could cite Dobbs to impose a bright-line
rule for resolving IVF disputes. However, the “profound moral question[s]”21 of a woman’s
choice to terminate a pregnancy or to have decision-making power about frozen preembryos only bolster the call for a system that responds to fluctuations and variability.
Inherent in my argument to resolve decision making for IVF disputes is the power to decide
whether to destroy frozen pre-embryos; Dobbs allows states to impose a bright-line rule
forbidding the disposal of unneeded or unwanted frozen pre-embryos.22 Although this Note
focuses on couples in which one party wants to use pre-embryos over the other’s objection,
15

With this categorization in mind, pure marital property issues in divorce will not apply because I do not
consider pre-embryos as mere property. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596. Without the marital property issue,
references throughout this Note to “divorce” include married couples who formally dissolve their marriage,
unmarried couples who separate, and married couples who separate without formally dissolving their
marriage.
16
See id. at 590.
17
See id.
18
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2022).
19
See Jan Hoffman, Infertility Patients and Doctors Fear Abortion Bans Could Restrict I.V.F., N.Y. TIMES
(July 6, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/05/health/ivf-embryos-roe-dobbs.html?smid=nytcoreios-share.
20
See Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2268–70.
21
See id. at 2284.
22
See Hoffman, supra note 19.
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the uncertain scope of Dobbs could include parties’ general decision making about preembryos, including whether to destroy pre-embryos with or without the other’s consent.
IVF disputes in divorce are an inherently gendered issue, which courts should not
ignore. Sex and gender differences in IVF disputes give rise to women’s physical and
sociological “sweat equity”—that is, the unique labor, or “sweat,” each party contributes
to IVF and entitles them to increased interest in prevailing. For example, Mary Sue
underwent painful and invasive medical procedures for IVF, while Junior ejaculated into a
cup.23 An equitable review of the sweat equity for physical procedures would give
commensurate weight to each party and find Mary Sue has more interest than Junior on
this particular issue. Recognizing the sex and gender differences in IVF and divorce
disputes encourages courts to use a balancing test that gives commensurate weight to the
unique labor each party contributes. Such considerations will inherently give rise to a
regime that correctly and increasingly favors women’s interests in decision making to use
or not use pre-embryos.
For the purposes of this Note, limiting the analytical scope to cis-heterosexual
couples allows me to focus on existing caselaw and opposite sex and gender dichotomies.
Transgender, nonbinary, and same-sex couples certainly experience many of the same or
similar circumstances surrounding IVF and divorce. However, heteronormativity is at the
root of many IVF disputes and courts should not minimize its role in considering this issue.
For instance, pre-embryos from a cis-heterosexual couple contain gametes from each
person, whereas those of a same-sex couple might have a gamete from one person and
another provided by a donor. In cis-heterosexual couples, one party is also subject to more
invasive medical procedures, and often that same party is subject to a different social
burden in parenthood and family life. As such, my discussion focuses on cis-women and
cis-men in heterosexual relationships.24
Lastly, the decision to use or not use pre-embryos is inherently connected to
parenthood. While I discuss sex and gender implications on parenthood, my focus is neither
parenthood itself nor the best interest of a child. Similarly, the court in Reber v. Reiss
correctly acknowledges that the issue at hand—decision making about pre-embryos—does
not guarantee parenthood.25 With this in mind, the court shifted attention away from
parenthood and instead towards an interest solely in procreation.26 While a balancing of
interests certainly could account for the best interest of a potential child, I do not dedicate
a full analysis to potential parenting obligations created by IVF disputes.27 Rather, I use
23

See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591–92 (Tenn. 1992), on reh'g in part, No. 34, 1992 WL 341632
(Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992).
24
Although I refer to “women” throughout this Note, any reference to women and pregnancy can easily
translate to “people who can become pregnant,” regardless of gender identity. Any discussions about social
experiences of women and mothers during IVF, pregnancy, and parenthood can easily translate to a
genderless construct of “mother.” Such a construct includes people who are ultimately burdened by
pregnancy, are socially predisposed to be primary caretakers for family and home life, and are socially
oppressed because of their sex, gender, and gendered dichotomies in spousal relationships, regardless of
gender identity or presentation.
25
Reber v. Reiss, 2012 PA Super 86, 42 A.3d 1131, 1138 (2012).
26
Id.
27
Parenting obligations and responsibilities are not necessarily assumed when courts award one party to
use disputed pre-embryos for pregnancy. See id. at 1140 (court discounted husband’s challenge to wife’s
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parenthood as a vehicle to help explain why sex and gender differences matter as part of
interest-balancing in IVF disputes.
Part I of this Note reviews the problems and questions posed by IVF and divorce
disputes and lays the groundwork for sex and gender considerations in adjudication. Part
II discusses the main categorical approaches courts use to address IVF disputes in divorce,
which problematically allow courts to ignore changing interests over time and women’s
unique sweat equity. Part III proposes a modified balancing test that allows courts to
consider parties’ changing interests over time, and, subsequently, consider specific
balancing factors that account for women’s unique sweat equity. This proposal would move
courts towards a regime that increasingly and accurately gives commensurate weight to
women’s interests in family law and related gendered issues. Entangled in a liberal desire
to move towards a world beyond gender constructs and confinement, I argue sex and
gender differences are already implicitly part of the discussion. Instead of circumventing
sex and gender considerations under the color of equality, courts should explicitly address
gendered questions to resolve IVF disputes.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM

In the Davis case, Mary Sue wanted to use the pre-embryos because she did not want
her IVF procedures to be for naught, while Junior wanted to destroy the pre-embryos to
avoid genetic parenthood.28 However, with inconsistent conceptualizations of what preembryos are, what they represent, and how courts should resolve these disputes, there is no
obvious resolution for couples litigating over the use or non-use of pre-embryos.
Further, disputes over frozen pre-embryos in divorce are increasingly inevitable.
Divorce is not uncommon,29 in-vitro fertilization is popular,30 and cryopreservation
availability means couples can store unused pre-embryos for longer.31 Women are also
having children later in life, increasing the likelihood of using IVF for pregnancy, either
because of their age or because they preserved viable eggs when they were younger.32 With
33% of adults in the United States somehow connected to fertility treatments, either for
use of disputed pre-embryos for pregnancy when wife confirmed she neither objected to husband’s wish to
participate in a future child’s life nor expected child support from husband).
28
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590, 603.
29
See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 8.
30
In 2018, 33% of adults in the United States reported they, or someone they know, used fertility treatment
to have a baby. “Fertility treatments” refers to a wide range of treatments, including IVF as an “assistive
reproductive technology” (ART). Gretchen Livingston, A Third of U.S. Adults Say They Have Used
Fertility Treatments or Know Someone Who Has, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 17, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/17/a-third-of-u-s-adults-say-they-have-used-fertilitytreatments-or-know-someone-who-has/ [hereinafter Livingston, A Third of U.S. Adults].
31
See Christianson, supra note 9; see Melantonio, Attivo, Gomes, Bonetti, & Monteleone supra note 9; see
Dowling-Lacey, Mayer, Jones, Bocca, Stadtmauer, & Oehninger, supra note 9.
32
A PEW report found “[t]he median age at which women become mothers in the U.S. is 26 [in 2014],
compared with 23 in 1994.” The report infers increased education opportunities, workforce involvement,
and later marriages impacted this shift to later parenthood for women. Furthermore, there has also been an
increase in women having babies in their 40s who have never been married, increasing from 31% of
women in 1994 to 55% of women in 2014. Gretchen Livingston, They’re Waiting Longer, but U.S. Women
Today More Likely to Have Children Than a Decade Ago, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2018/01/18/theyre-waiting-longer-but-u-s-women-today-morelikely-to-have-children-than-a-decade-ago/.
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themselves or someone they know,33 and a divorce rate nearly half of the marriage rate,34
it is reasonable to expect overlap between couples who undergo IVF procedures and
couples who eventually divorce or separate.
The various approaches state courts use to resolve IVF and divorce disputes overlook
two essential issues. First, they allow courts to disregard the high stakes relating to use or
non-use of pre-embryos that warrant allowing people to change their minds. Second, they
give courts discretion to ignore that women, generally, experience IVF, pregnancy, and
parenthood differently from men.
A. The Current Categorical Approaches Do Not Effectively Address Changing Interests
Over Time
Contract disputes reveal two sets of interests: what parties wanted at the time of
contracting and what they want at the time of dispute. Regardless of which set of interests
courts focus on, IVF dispute resolutions carry significant weight. These resolutions
determine whether someone becomes a parent, whether someone’s medical procedures for
IVF were for naught, and whether someone has agency over reproductive autonomy. As
such, courts should not ignore new interests—interests at the time of dispute that did not
exist at the time of contracting—in favor of maintaining predictability from an original
contract.
For instance, imagine, at the start of their IVF procedures, Mary Sue and Junior Davis
contracted to destroy any remaining frozen pre-embryos if they got divorced. They made
this decision knowing they had fertility issues and IVF was likely necessary to have genetic
children. Several years later, suppose Mary Sue gets cancer and undergoes chemotherapy,
rendering her unable to produce new eggs for pregnancy or IVF. The circumstances are
now very different from where they started; if the parties divorced, Mary Sue would no
longer have the option of trying to extract her eggs for IVF with different sperm, whereas
Junior’s ability to fertilize a different egg remains unchanged. 35 Alternatively, imagine
Mary Sue and Junior formally contracted to destroy any remaining frozen pre-embryos,
but when they divorce, Mary Sue is in her late forties and decides, if she wants to have a
child on her own, she needs to become pregnant as soon as possible. In both scenarios, the
circumstances changed such that Mary Sue and Junior’s initial agreement no longer reflects
the present interests of both parties.
Of the three categorical approaches used by state courts,36 the contract approach
appears the most straightforward because it allows couples to decide what they anticipate
wanting to do with frozen pre-embryos. Nevertheless, if the Davises’ circumstances
significantly changed over time, the contract approach would preclude a court from
reviewing whether the terms equitably represented their current interests. Similar to

33

Livingston, A Third of U.S. Adults, supra note 30.
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 8 (the divorce rate of 2.7 per 1,000 adults in the
United States is compared to a marriage rate of 6.1 per 1,000 adults).
35
The same reasoning follows if the roles were reversed, where Junior became sterile while Mary Sue
continued to have viable eggs for pregnancy.
36
Courts typically use one of three categorical approaches: “the contractual approach, the contemporaneous
mutual consent approach, and the balancing approach.” Reber v. Reiss, 2012 PA Super 86, 42 A.3d 1131,
1134 (2012).
34
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prenuptial agreements,37 disposition contracts allow couples to discuss and negotiate their
private interests before IVF, with the hope that their desired use for pre-embryos will be
reflected if they ever divorce. However, individuals and couples change their minds. Susan
Klock, for the New England Journal of Medicine, found that, after a three-year storage
period, 71% of couples changed their pre-embryo disposition preferences from what they
initially decided.38 This change in disposition preferences reflects a very human experience
of changing interests—people get older or undergo medical procedures that impact their
fertility, people change their minds about having children, couples break up, couples
become incompatible co-parents, or people change their mind for any myriad of reasons.
For a dispute determining whether someone can get pregnant or become a parent,
courts should not apply rigid rules that ignore changing circumstances and human
indecisiveness about intimate issues. Rather, courts should account for these changing
interests in their determinations.
B. Resolving IVF Disputes Should Not Ignore Sex and Gender Differences
The right to have or not have children, particularly in the context of IVF, is deeply a
women’s issue because their sweat equities are vastly different from men’s. As such, courts
should account for sex and gender differences in resolving IVF disputes, including
differences in IVF procedures and social experiences of parents and potential parents. IVF
procedures, pregnancy, and parenthood are distinct experiences that further parse out sex
and gender differences: IVF procedures are the medical and laboratory procedures used to
achieve pregnancy; pregnancy is the physical experience of carrying an embryo-turnedfetus, which may also lead to birth and breastfeeding; and parenthood is the social and
familial experience of raising a child. These distinct terms may similarly contribute to sex
and gender-based sweat equities, but they create unique experiences that should be afforded
their own consideration and weight. Resolving IVF disputes should therefore compare and
balance factors impacted by sex and gender to accurately reflect sweat equities. Such a
balance will, in most scenarios, afford more weight to women’s interests than men’s.
First, IVF is a complicated and invasive medical procedure that places a far higher
burden on women. Typically, IVF procedures can be distilled to five steps.39 The procedure
begins by stimulating the woman’s ovaries to produce eggs with fertility drugs, often with
a series of injections.40 During this stage, the woman also undergoes transvaginal
ultrasounds and regular blood tests.41 Next, the woman undergoes a surgical procedure to
remove eggs from her body.42 This procedure requires a follicular aspiration, in which an

Prenuptial Agreement, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“An agreement made before
marriage usu. to resolve issues of support and property division if the marriage ends in divorce or by the
death of a spouse.”).
38
Susan C. Klock, Sandra Sheinin, & Ralph Kazer, The Disposition of Unused Frozen Embryos, 345 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 69, 69 (2001).
39
John D. Jacobson, David Zieve, & Brenda Conaway, In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), MEDLINE PLUS,
https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/007279.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2022).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
37
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ultrasound-directed needle is used to remove eggs,43 and may also require a laparoscopy.44
The next two stages are conducted in a lab: the eggs are placed in a petri-dish along with
sperm for insemination and fertilization, and then the fertilized gamete cells are observed
to see whether they divide and become pre-embryos.45 Once the cells become pre-embryos,
they are either frozen (i.e., cryogenically preserved) for later use or transplanted into a
womb via catheter.46 By contrast, men’s physical involvement in creating pre-embryos is
minimal: “All that is required is a private room, an empty jar and, perhaps, a Playboy
magazine or video.”47 An undeniable takeaway is that the physical procedures related to
IVF are far more physically invasive and demanding for women than men.
Second, parenthood is a gendered issue. Generally, women have a different social
experience in home and family life. For example, Arlie Hochschild, a professor of
sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, reviewed how families managed the
“second shift,” the shift of family care needed outside of the labor-force workday.48
Hochschild observed the assumption that the mother’s role in the family was more
important than the father’s, whereas the father’s role in the workforce was more important
than the mother’s.49 A Census Bureau report in 2021 reaffirmed this gendered division: for
stay-at-home parents in heterosexual marriages with children under 15 years old, there
were 14.8 million stay-at-home mothers, compared to 204,000 stay-at-home fathers.50
Moreover, the physical constraints imposed by pregnancy and breastfeeding on femalebodied mothers creates a chain of dependent relationships.51 Mothers experience a sense
of both vulnerability and responsibility as the baby depends on the mother for care, and the
mother depends on others to take care of her while she is occupied with the baby.52
Generally, these constructions place higher burdens of pregnancy and parenthood on
women, putting more at stake for them in decision making about becoming pregnant and
becoming parents.
Professor Ruth Colker argues that considering differences between women’s and
men’s experiences is imperative to weighing their interests: “By recognizing the ways in
which women and men are not similarly situated with respect to reproduction, courts can
See id (follicular aspiration is a surgery that “inserts a thin needle through the vagina into the ovary and
sacs (follicles) containing the eggs” and uses a suction device to “pull[] the eggs and fluid out of each
follicle, one at a time.”).
44
Laparoscopy, MEDLINE PLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/labtests/laparoscopy/#:~:text=A%20laparoscopy%20is%20a%20type,through%20the%20skin%20during%20s
urgery (last visited Jul. 6, 2022) (laparoscopy is a surgery that inserts a camera into the abdomen through a
small incision via a thin tube, or laparoscope, allowing surgeons to see inside without major trauma or
larger incisions.).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
See Waldman, supra note 14, at 1053.
48
The second shift includes physical, emotional, and social labor needed to take care of the family unit,
childrearing, and the home. ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING
FAMILIES AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 7–10 (3d ed. 1989).
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Id. at 38–40.
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CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2021 (Nov. 29, 2021),
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/demo/tables/families/2021/cps-2021/tabfg8-all.xls.
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Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist
Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 149, 210 (2000).
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begin to correct this imbalance by presumptively awarding frozen embryos to women who
desire to use them to enhance their reproductive capacity following divorce.”53 In
advocating for a default rule, Colker seeks to imbed women’s unique sweat equity into
courts’ review of IVF disputes. However, her argument expounds beyond IVF sweat
equity. Rather, Colker argues, courts should have a default rule for women to make amends
for the ways that women are generally disadvantaged to men, particularly in the wake of
divorce: “Just as men are frequently more economically stable and wealthier than women
after divorce, so too are men often reproductively richer after divorce.”54
Although Colker’s reasoning is descriptive of women’s experiences with IVF and
divorce, it is important to consider how giving deference to women would impact men.
Professor Ellen Waldman similarly advocates for greater judicial deference in favor of
women who want to use disputed pre-embryos to become pregnant.55 In her work, she
reviews paternal disengagement and sperm donors’ attitudes towards offspring to find
“men in general suffer little detriment by use of their embryos.”56 Moreover, Waldman
examined whether there is an inherent psychological burden in “forced parenthood” for
men and found “psychological parenthood does not necessarily flow from a biological
connection.”57 This gendered difference in attachment to gametes, Forman argues, warrants
that “women should be afforded more control over the use of their gametes and the embryos
created from them.”58
Waldman reviewed “psychological burdens” of unwanted use of pre-embryos on
sperm donors.59 Her research did not necessarily include emotional discomfort of men
when women use pre-embryos for pregnancy without their ex-husbands’ consent.60 There
is a different emotional discomfort between sperm donors and former spouses because
former spouses know each other and formally had a relationship that ended, leaving the
53

Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm Is Cheap, Eggs Are Not, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1063, 1066
(1996). Melissa Herrera similarly suggests courts’ decisions in IVF disputes should favor women,
regardless of what they want for the pre-embryos, by situating them as property. See Melissa B. Herrera,
Arizona Gamete Donor Law: A Call for Recognizing Women's Asymmetrical Property Interest in PreEmbryo Disposition Disputes, 30 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 129, 140 (2019). She argues that because
of reproductive limitations on women and invasive IVF procedures, a woman should prevail if she wants to
use disputed pre-embryos to become pregnant. See id. at 129. Alternatively, if a woman wants to prevent
the other party from using the pre-embryos, she should still prevail because the same reproductive
limitations and invasive IVF procedures give her a greater property interest. See id. However, I do not
propose situating pre-embryos as property in which parties can have a lesser or greater interest because
such review would subject pre-embryos to marital property limitations. But see id. at 140. For example, if
eight frozen pre-embryos created by a couple are considered mere marital property, each party could be
entitled to 50%, or four pre-embryos each, upon dissolution of marriage. As the court in Davis concludes,
frozen pre-embryos are best considered to be neither children, subject to family law, nor property, subject
to equitable distribution upon divorce. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992), on reh'g in part,
No. 34, 1992 WL 341632 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992). Rather, pre-embryos “occupy an interim category that
entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life,” or a status of quasi-personhood
and quasi-property. Colker, supra note 53, at 1066.
54
Colker, supra note 53, at 1066.
55
Waldman, supra note 14, at 1061.
56
Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce & Family Law Contracting: A Model for
Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 403 (2013) (citing Waldman, supra note 14, at 1040–52).
57
Waldman, supra note 14, at 1060.
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Forman, supra note 56, at 412.
59
See id. at 403 (citing Waldman, supra note 14, at 1060).
60
See id.
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couple sour enough to end up in litigation. For example, if Mary Sue Davis used the
disputed pre-embryos to become pregnant and have a baby, Junior Davis would know he
biologically fathered a child with his ex-wife, now out of his care. Sperm donors, who
Waldman finds can more easily emotionally detach themselves, remain anonymous.
However, emotional discomfort is not enough to outweigh Waldman’s argument to
favor women’s decision making based on paternal detachment or Colker’s argument based
on sex and gender differences. If Junior wanted to use the pre-embryos to have a baby with
another person, Mary Sue’s emotional discomfort, combined with her physical IVF sweat
equity, should outweigh Junior’s interest. Conversely, if Mary Sue wanted to use the preembryos to become pregnant, and the pre-embryos were her only viable option to become
a parent, her interest in having a baby combined with her IVF sweat equity should still
outweigh Junior’s emotional discomfort.61 Unease or distress is certainly significant, but
should not dramatically change how courts account for sex and gender differences to give
commensurate weight to women’s interests.
Conversely, Deborah Forman reviews that male and female gamete donors may
experience similar attitudes towards their donated specimens, challenging that any genderbased differences in attitudes are mere social constructions.62 Forman further argues that
the generalization that “men as a group more easily disengage from their offspring than
women” fails to account for a specific man who disputes the fate of pre-embryos because
he does not foresee easy disengagement.63 However, I do not challenge that a specific
couple might have particular emotional attachments to pre-embryos. Rather, courts should
give commensurate attention to sex and gender differences because of the broad social
constructions.
While Forman cautions against making sex-difference-based claims,64 I view sex
differences as impossible to ignore because women and men have profoundly different
experiences with IVF, pregnancy, and parenthood. The Court in Dobbs effectively
disposed of women’s Fourteenth Amendment rights and wrestled away their ability to
decide whether to remain pregnant,65 a substantive right they did not correspondingly
restrict for men. Dobbs signals that it is time for courts to acknowledge and address their
different treatment of women and men and to review those differences in a court of equity.
Courts should acknowledge and give due weight to the unique sweat equities that position
women to have higher stakes in IVF disputes. If we are to adopt a specific approach to
resolve IVF disputes, whether by judicial standard or statute,66 sex and gender differences
must be part of the calculation to represent the holistic impact of IVF and divorce disputes
on women.

61

See Waldman, supra note 14, at 1060.
See Forman, supra note 56, at 413.
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Id. at 412.
64
See id. at 413.
65
See Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2317 (2022) (Breyer, Sotomayor, &
Kagan, JJJ., dissenting).
66
See Alexandra Faver, Whose Embryo Is It Anyway?: The Need for A Federal Statute Enforcing Frozen
Embryo Disposition Contracts, 55 FAM. CT. REV. 633 (Oct. 23, 2017) (discussing the need for federal
legislation).
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II. CATEGORICAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING IVF DISPUTES ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH
CHANGING INTERESTS
Since Davis in 1992, courts across state jurisdictions have generally recognized and
employed one of three categorical approaches to IVF disputes: disposition contracts,
contemporaneous mutual consent, and a balancing interests test.67 However, the structures
of these approaches are incompatible and impractical for addressing parties’ changing
interests over time. Disposition contracts could bind the Davises to a decision that no longer
reflects their interests several years later. Contemporaneous mutual consent would attempt
to let the Davises decide in real time what they want but would be impractical for a couple
in litigation. Finally, the current balancing interests test fails to define the factors
considered; in an attempt to account for changing interests, this framework allows judges
to overlook and ignore implications of sex and gender differences. The following subparts
discuss case examples that use the different categorical approaches, outlining each
approach’s flawed ability to confront and account for changing interests over time.
A. Disposition Contracts
Some courts resolve IVF disputes by upholding disposition contracts, or agreements
couples made at the beginning of the IVF process to provide for potential contingencies,
including divorce.68 However, disposition contracts allow courts to hold couples to an
original agreement that no longer reflects the interests of both parties. In doing so, courts
subvert their stated goal of keeping “quintessentially personal” decisions in the hands of
the parties.69
At the beginning of their IVF procedures, balancing the Davises’ interests might have
favored neither party using the frozen embryos if they divorced. However, after five years
and a round of chemotherapy for Mary Sue, a new balancing might favor her interest in
using the pre-embryos.70 Generally, contract disputes reveal two sets of interests. The first
is what the parties wanted at the time of contracting. The second set of interests is what the
parties want at the time of dispute. If those interests are significantly different, the question
is whether courts should favor one set of interests over the other.
Courts that use the disposition contract approach may do so under the color of
keeping “quintessentially personal” decisions in the hands of a couple.71 However, when
interests change over time, the contract approach becomes an implicit balancing test that
favors predictability over reflecting a person’s current interests about pre-embryos. In other
words, courts want parties to balance their own interests, but if their interests change by
the time of dispute, the courts will uphold the initial agreements instead of allowing parties
to review their personal decisions; decisions courts asserted should remain with the parties.
Legal commentators argue that parties need to make decisions, even in the face of

67

See Reber v. Reiss, 2012 PA Super 86, 42 A.3d 1131, 1134 (2012).
See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998).
69
See id. at 180.
70
See Reber, 42 A.3d at 1132.
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See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179.
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uncertainties, to ensure effective and predictable contracting.72 However, for
quintessentially personal matters about pre-embryos, which have quasi-property and quasipersonhood status and can determine whether someone becomes a genetic parent, courts
should not hold people to such steadfast accountability. Instead, courts should include
human indecisiveness as a legitimate legal consideration.
In Kass v. Kass, Maureen and Steven Kass disputed during their divorce proceedings
about the disposition of five cryopreserved pre-embryos procured through IVF five years
earlier.73 Before the IVF procedures, they signed a series of consent forms including
provisions stipulating that a property settlement would determine legal ownership of the
pre-embryos in the event of divorce, and that, if they no longer wished to become pregnant,
the IVF program would use the pre-embryos for research and then dispose of them.74 By
the time of dispute, Maureen wanted to use the pre-embryos and claimed it was “her only
chance for genetic motherhood.”75 Steven, by contrast, wanted to abide by the prior
disposition agreement imbedded within the consent form.76
The court upheld the prior agreement as a contract, favoring reliance on contracts to
encourage parties to consider contingencies in writing, avoid costly litigation, and
“minimize misunderstandings and maximize procreative liberty by reserving to the
progenitors the authority to make what is in the first instance a quintessentially personal,
private decision.”77 Recognizing the deeply personal nature of IVF disputes, the court
reasoned couples should make disposition decisions, not the legislature or judiciary, and
emphasized the importance of “joint decision” for pre-embryo transplantation.78 It is
uncertain how long this notion of keeping intimate decisions in the hands of the parties will
remain a goal for many state courts. As Dobbs usurped women’s constitutional right to
choose abortion, a similarly intimate reproductive issue, state legislatures may increasingly
make quintessentially personal decisions in women’s stead.79 However, until Dobbs

72

See Diane K. Yang, What's Mine is Mine, But What's Yours Should Also Be Mine: An Analysis of State
Statutes That Mandate The Implantation of Frozen Preembryos, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 587, 627 (2002)
(“Although the individual's circumstances and state of mind prior to and after IVF may drastically change,
human indecisiveness and uncertainty are variables in any contract”) (citing Susan B. Apel, Esq.,
Disposition of Frozen Embryos: Are Contracts the Solution?, 27 VT. B.J. 29, 32 (Mar. 2001).
73
Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177.
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Id. at 176–78.
75
Id. at 175.
76
Id.
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Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
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Id. at 180–81.
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See Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2265 (2022) (claiming Roe v. Wade
wrongly “usurped the power to address a question of profound moral and social importance that the
Constitution unequivocally leaves for the people,” thereby vesting in states the power to govern abortion
issues. Dobbs, instead of protecting the right to choose at a federal level, allows elected officials, not
individuals, to make intimate decisions).
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definitively expands to other reproductive issues,80 the Kass court’s reasoning remains
valid to support disposition contracts.81
However, the Kass court failed to acknowledge that its decision to uphold the original
agreement subverted its stated goal to keep the decision in the Kasses’ hands. When
Maureen changed her mind because she wanted to have a baby despite the divorce, the
court usurped her ability to reflect that interest in a resolution. Instead, the court implicitly
used a balancing test that gave more weight to Steven’s interest in a predictable outcome
than Maureen’s interest in becoming a parent.82 The court said it did not want to make these
quintessentially personal decisions, and yet here it did so anyway.
The contract approach is flawed because “quintessentially personal” feelings can
change. In Kass, although the literal circumstances did not change from the disposition
agreement, the circumstances of personal decisions did.83 Maureen signed a consent form
to acknowledge she might not successfully become pregnant and she might one day get
divorced. However, when a couple is happily married and trying difficult procedures to
become pregnant, it may seem unimaginable that both the IVF procedures and the marriage
would sour. Faced with the reality of divorce and her last chance at genetic motherhood
slipping away, Maureen changed her mind.
While courts might favor enforcing disposition agreements for pre-embryos,84
ignoring the emotional and physical harms incurred by the person whose interests
significantly changed is difficult. With this in mind, the Kass court, without addressing the
changing interests issue head on, alluded to the potential scenario where “significantly
Formally, the Dobbs opinion only applies to abortion. Id. at 2277–78 (“Nothing in this opinion should be
understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.”). However, Justice Thomas, in his
concurrence, claims the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment only secures process rights, not
substantive rights, expressing his intention to expand the Dobbs reasoning to additional substantive due
process cases. Id. at 2301 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]n future cases, we should reconsider all of this
Court's substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell”). The dissent
recognizes the majority’s assurance that Dobbs applies only to abortion as deeply unreliable. Id. at 2319
(Breyer, Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJJ., dissenting) (“the right to terminate a pregnancy arose straight out of the
right to purchase and use contraception . . . led . . . to rights of same-sex intimacy and marriage. They are
all part of the same constitutional fabric, protecting autonomous decision making over the most personal of
life decisions. The majority . . . is eager to tell us today that nothing it does ‘cast[s] doubt on precedents that
do not concern abortion.’ But how could that be?” (internal citations omitted)).
81
See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180.
82
Forman argues disposition agreements should be enforceable, but only if the contract includes safeguards
that account for the “vulnerability of patients undergoing treatment, the difficulty of forecasting future
views about disposition, and the myriad legal issues that stem from the decision.” Forman, supra note 56, at
442. Forman advocates for assurance that pre-determined expectations about pre-embryos will be fulfilled.
Id. at 433 (“One person's freedom to change his or her mind comes at the expense of another's freedom to
rely on a promised disposition or to choose a particular option . . . . An embryo disposition contract may
provide assurance to parties undergoing in vitro fertilization that their expectations regarding use of their
embryos (and thus their right to procreate or not) will in fact be fulfilled in the future”). Although
attempting to incorporate sensitivities into the contract approach, Forman’s modified contract approach
similarly disregards that doing so inherently employs a balancing test that favors smooth procedure over
extreme emotional disposition.
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See generally Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174.
84
See Forman, supra note 56, at 392 (“Our society and our legal system presume that contracts are an
appropriate and desirable way to order human relations and transactions, so valid contracts should be
enforced unless there is a good reason not to do so”) (citing Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for
Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2313–15 (1995)).
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changed circumstances” might “preclude contract enforcement.”85 However, by enforcing
the disposition agreement as a binding contract, despite Maureen’s changed interest, the
court failed to keep a quintessentially personal decision in the hands of both parties. As
such, the contract approach subverts both the court’s stated goal and the autonomy couples
should have regarding intimate pre-embryo matters.
B. Contemporaneous Mutual Consent
Some courts attempt to address changing interests by favoring contemporaneous
mutual consent, where couples must agree at the time of litigation to use or not use the
disputed pre-embryos.86 However, this approach is potentially impractical, particularly for
couples unable to resolve divorce disputes outside of litigation.
In In re Marriage of Witten, Arthur Witten III and Tamera Witten disputed the use
of seventeen cryopreserved pre-embryos.87 The couple previously signed a disposition
agreement requiring joint approval for pre-embryo use and providing several contingencies
for pre-embryo disposal.88 In the divorce proceedings, Tamera challenged the disposition
agreement because she wanted to use the pre-embryos to have a genetic child, claiming
Arthur changed his mind about becoming a parent.89
The court considered several questions about changing interests over time. First, it
reviewed whether it can permit the use of pre-embryos over one party’s objection.90 Next,
the court reviewed whether the disposition agreement is enforceable when one of the
parties is no longer comfortable with the decision.91 The court held that, “absent a change
of heart by one of the partners,” pre-embryo disposition agreements do not violate public
policy.92 However, in the event a party does have a change of heart, neither party can use
or dispose of the pre-embryos without the other’s consent.93
In In re Marriage of Witten, the decision hinged on whether the contract’s
contingency terms covered divorce.94 In a contrasting case, A.Z. v. B.Z., the actual prior
agreement carried minimal weight.95 Instead, the court reasoned that changed
circumstances were sufficient to override the couple’s disposition agreement.96 Thus, the
court held it would not force an individual to become a genetic parent over their
contemporaneous objection.97 Importantly, this case reviewed “forced parenthood” in the
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Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 182 n.4.
See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Iowa 2003).
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See id. at 772.
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Id. at 772–73, 780.
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Id. at 780.
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Id. at 782–83 (emphasis in original).
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Id. at 772.
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Faver, supra note 66, at 641 (citing A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1051).
97
A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059.
86

145

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2022

context of IVF,98 a potentially moot discussion after the Dobbs decision.99 Dobbs could
invalidate the A.Z. court’s reasoning for contemporaneous mutual consent if certain states
expand their abortion bans to include destroying embryos created in a lab, thus requiring
forced parenthood in some scenarios.100
The contemporaneous mutual consent approach directly addresses the concern of
fraught interests in using or not using pre-embryos. However, this approach leaves the
chance that pre-embryos will remain in indefinite cryopreservation purgatory. Under
contemporaneous mutual consent, if Mary Sue and Junior Davis could not agree to use or
destroy the frozen pre-embryos, they would remain frozen. This is not a neutral outcome
because Junior would achieve his goal of preventing Mary Sue from using the pre-embryos.
Additionally, this approach is impractical. If a couple agrees contemporaneously on the use
or non-use of pre-embryos to become pregnant, with or without a decision for the nonusing party to exercise or terminate parenting responsibilities, why would this issue be in
court?
Once again, courts implicitly employ a balancing test favoring non-use of preembryos over use. For both In re Marriage of Witten and A.Z. v. B.Z., the court’s use of
contemporaneous mutual consent implicitly held the man’s interest in challenging the
woman’s use of pre-embryos outweighed the woman’s interest in becoming pregnant.101
Couples attempting to resolve divorce disputes in court are likely doing so because they
could not come to an agreement outside of litigation. Thus, enforcing an approach requiring
parties to come to mutual consent will either resolve nothing for the parties or inherently
rule in favor of the party objecting to pre-embryo use.
C. Balancing Interests
The final categorical approach is a balancing test in which courts weigh the interests
of each party to determine who should prevail in an IVF dispute. The court in Reber v.
Reiss used a balancing approach to decide who has control over pre-embryos.102 Upon
learning of her cancer diagnosis, Andrea Lynn Reiss and Bret Howard Reber decided to
begin IVF procedures to preserve their chance of having children after Andrea’s cancer
treatments.103 After “eight rounds of chemotherapy and 37 rounds of radiation” and
initiated divorce proceedings, Andrea was 44 years old, infertile from the cancer
treatments, and wanted control of the pre-embryos to attempt pregnancy.104 Bret, on the
other hand, found a new partner with whom he intentionally conceived a genetic child.105
The court used a balancing test to weigh each party’s interest and found that Andrea’s
interest in using the pre-embryos, when she had no other options to have a genetic child,
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See id.
See generally Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
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See generally id.
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See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 768 (Iowa 2003); see A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1051.
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Although parties and the Reber court considered the pre-embryos to be marital property, this Note’s
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outweighed Bret’s desire to avoid procreation.106 For Andrea, the court considered the
unique and meaningful value of “be[ing] pregnant”107 and her “compelling interests in
using the pre-embryos,” which represented “what is likely her only chance at genetic
parenthood” or parenthood at all.108 For Bret, the court considered his interest in avoiding
forced procreation and parenthood.109 With these factors in mind, the court held the
balancing test tipped in Andrea’s favor.110
Any balancing test allows courts to exercise discretion, which warrants asking what
tools courts use to make such rulings. Without a clearly defined test, courts currently have
overly broad discretion to both select interests for review and balance those interests
accordingly. To hone in on this discretion, courts should define balancing factors that
consider sex and gender to give commensurate weight to women’s interests.
III. TOWARDS AN EQUITABLE REVIEW FOR WOMEN
A. In Lieu of Bright-Line Rules, Courts Should Apply a Modified Balancing Test
Neither courts nor legislatures should impose a bright-line rule that comes directly
from one of the current categorical approaches. In the absence of a federal statute governing
pre-embryo disposition disputes,111 jurisdictions have developed inconsistent methods and
resolutions,112 precluding broad predictability. However, as the court in Davis described,
pre-embryos “occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of
their potential for human life,”113 or a status of quasi-personhood and quasi-property. As
such, courts should not wield any of the current categorical approaches as a rigid rule
because they fail to account for changing interests over time and allow courts to ignore sex
and gender differences. A new rule should allow couples to both analyze how sex and
106

Id. at 1134–36.
Id. at 1138–39 (“There is no question that the ability to have a biological child and/or be pregnant is a
distinct experience from adoption. Thus, simply because adoption or foster parenting may be available to
Wife, it does not mean that such options should be given equal weight in a balancing test. Adoption is a
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question that it occupies a different place for a woman than the opportunity to be pregnant and/or have a
biological child. As a matter of science, traditional adoption does not provide a woman with the
opportunity to be pregnant.”).
108
Id. at 1140.
109
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110
Id. at 1142.
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2017),
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gender differences impact their interests and afford them the human experience of good
faith fluctuation in their decisions.
Several states use statutes to govern the disposition of pre-embryos in divorce, but
primarily limit their focus to parenthood. Minnesota law, for example, provides that a child
born from IVF performed after a couple divorces is not the legal child of the former spouse,
unless the former spouse consented to treating the child as their child.114 A Texas law
requires similar consent, but also stipulates that a party may withdraw consent before
implantation.115 While these laws resolve who is a legal parent to a child born through IVF
after divorce, they do not resolve whether one party can use or destroy pre-embryos over
the other’s objection. By contrast, Arizona law awards disposition of disputed pre-embryos
to the spouse most likely to successfully use the pre-embryos for the birth of a
child,116 establishing a clear default rule for use over non-use of pre-embryos.
Courts should be wary of a bright-line rule’s effect on women because each of the
current approaches imposes an implicit or explicit balancing test. A balancing test alone
imposes “a notion of formal equality on a situation in which the parties were not in a
formally equal position.”117 Specifically applied to women, the current categorical
approaches bind women to decisions that no longer reflect their interests or circumstances,
allow courts to leave pre-embryos in indefinite purgatory, and allow courts to discount the
physical and emotional harms found in women’s unique sweat equity. As such, even if
courts wanted to establish a uniform rule, they do not currently have the tools to equitably
do so.
As an alternative, Alexandra Faver proposes a federal statute uniformly protecting
against and resolving IVF disputes.118 Faver proposes a statute that requires (1) informed
consent and unambiguous drafting, (2) mandatory psychological counseling and a waiting
period, (3) independent legal representation, (4) individual gamete freezing,119 (5) limiting
the term of the agreement, (6) liability of the professional and facility performing the IVF,
and (7) default rules if the agreement is found unconscionable. 120 Faver’s proposal
unusually calls for a default rule to thaw-out and destroy pre-embryos if the dispute remains
unresolved.121 Her proposal gives rise to many of the same concerns discussed for the
current categorical approaches, such as her default rule to thaw pre-embryos that favors
non-use over use.122
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MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-120.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.706.
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Colker, supra note 53, at 1073.
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Id. at 640 (“[W]omen can freeze their eggs as well . . . . [T]he process for egg freezing is quite similar to
cryopreserving embryos. The sole difference is eggs are cryopreserved the same day as retrieval, while
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Although Faver correctly recognizes that a default rule may be required to resolve
intimate issues that parties may never agree on,123 her proposal falls short of applying a
feminist analysis that equitably reviews each parties’ interests. A feminist statutory
construction would also fall short in efficacy: If Mary Sue Davis underwent invasive IVF
procedures, a feminist analysis would say she should either be allowed to benefit from
those procedures or decide whether someone else should benefit from her sweat equity.
However, implementing a statute that says, “the woman prevails in IVF disputes, no matter
what,” would be a clear Equal Protection violation, unless the statute substantially relates
to government interests.124 Alternatively, statutory provisions could outline steps to resolve
IVF disputes and employ balancing steps as a statutory construction. Nevertheless, the
prescriptive nature of statutes might preclude courts from evaluating IVF disputes case-bycase, which, despite my argument for across-the-board increased weight for women, is
necessary to ensure each parties’ interests are reflected accurately.
With this in mind, IVF and divorce disputes should remain within common law
purview. Under common law, a modified balancing test, as described in the next subpart,
can define specific balancing factors, but leaves courts to interpret on a case-by-case
manner whether certain factors are missing from the test or if certain included factors are
irrelevant. Further, instead of encoding a statute limited to IVF disputes, a modified
balancing test would establish a foundation that considers women’s unique sweat equities
throughout family law and related gendered areas of the law. This method is particularly
important in the wake of Dobbs, which grants decisions about women’s reproductive
choices to the states.125 If such decisions are under states’ purview, courts should wield a
common law modified balancing test to give commensurate weight to women’s interests
and evaluate IVF disputes on a case-by-case basis.
B. A Modified Balancing Test Gives Commensurate Weight to Women’s Interests
The current balancing test affords courts overly broad discretion to decide which
interests to balance and how to balance them in IVF disputes. As such, I propose modifying
the balancing test to define factors that account for changing interests over time, as well as
implications of sex and gender differences.
Many courts prioritize disposition agreements for pre-embryos or employ a
balancing test to weigh each party’s interest in the pre-embryos.126 For example, the court
in Szafranski v. Dunston found that, without a private disposition agreement, the woman’s
infertility due to chemotherapy created a greater interest in using pre-embryos than the
man’s interest in preventing their use.127 Synthesizing the contract and balancing test
approaches simply applies two flawed methods in a sequential fashion because a binding
contract does not allow for changing interests and human indecisiveness, and the current
balancing test is too undefined. My proposed framework attempts to let couples make their
own decisions, or, alternatively, balance their interests equitably. However, equitably
123
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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balancing their interests requires modifying both the contract and the balancing interests
approaches.
First, courts should look to any disposition agreements couples previously signed to
review if any interests have changed over time. If Mary Sue and Junior Davis made a preembryo disposition agreement and their interests and circumstances remain substantially
the same, courts should honor that. Nevertheless, changed circumstances, as seen in In re
Marriage of Witten, include a person changing their mind about their previous decision.128
Under the guidance of Witten, what constitutes sufficiently changed circumstances or
interests to warrant throwing out the contract is a low standard. Thus, pre-embryo
disposition agreements ought rarely to be enforced in court because if there are no
substantial changes, including interests, circumstances, and feelings, there is likely little
need for any judicial intervention. Alternatively, if Mary Sue originally agreed to destroy
pre-embryos, but later decided she wanted to try and have a baby on her own, that should
be enough to discard the agreement and proceed to the balancing test.
Next, in the absence of a sustained pre-embryo disposition agreement, the court
should proceed with a modified balancing that uses defined factors to consider sex and
gender differences. This balancing test should appropriately give more weight to the
woman’s interests: the person who underwent invasive medical procedures, the person who
could become pregnant, and the person who is sociologically predisposed to becoming a
primary parent if a child is conceived and born to the couple.
The balancing factors fit into two general categories: physical harms and social
harms. For physical harms, courts should balance factors implicated by sex differences.
Primarily, courts should consider the sweat equity each person contributed to create preembryos, including invasive medical procedures for IVF, related medical procedures, and
side effects from these procedures. Courts should also consider the number of procedures,
the length of time for these procedures, and the length of time for side effects. Related
medical procedures can include alternative fertility treatments, assistive reproductive
technologies, and prior pregnancies.
Courts should also balance each person’s ability to procreate genetic children without
the disputed pre-embryos. For example, courts can ask whether both parties are able to
produce viable gametes, whether their ages significantly hinder their ability to procreate,
and whether they conceived genetic children in the past. If both parties are still medically
able to have genetic children, courts can ask if they can do so without IVF or related
assistive reproductive technologies. If they are unable or unlikely to have genetic children
without IVF, courts can ask if they can afford the cost of more rounds of IVF and whether
they are willing and able to go through the medical procedures again.
Although more abstract, courts should also balance factors for social harms,
including many factors implicated by gender differences. Courts should evaluate whether
parties have emotional attachments to the disputed pre-embryos, whether parties
conceptualize the pre-embryos as potential children, and whether parties can disengage
from such attachments. For the party who wants to use the pre-embryos, courts should
consider whether that person wants the other person to serve as a co-parent or as a gamete
donor. If a couple were to become co-parents, courts should consider which person is likely
to become the primary caretaker. Courts should evaluate whether the party proponing to

128

See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Iowa 2003).

150

Vol. 18:1]

Lilah Kleban

use pre-embryos has a good faith intention to become a parent, and not a malicious intent
to entrap the other party in emotional and financial liabilities.
The scale should, predictably, tip heavily in favor of women’s decision making for
pre-embryos. For example, if Junior wanted to destroy pre-embryos and Mary Sue wanted
to use them, the physical harms would weigh in favor of Mary Sue: her contributed sweat
equities, including all procedures in pursuit of extracting eggs for IVF, were far more
invasive and demanding than the procedures required of Junior (ejaculating into a cup). If
either party became infertile and unable to produce genetic children without the disputed
pre-embryos, the infertility would afford the respective party more weight, regardless of
sex or gender.
The social harms would also weigh in favor of Mary Sue: she wanted to use the preembryos to become pregnant, outweighing Junior’s emotional discomfort. All else even,
the physical harms incurred through IVF procedures, the general disposition that women
are less likely to experience pre-embryo detachment, or the woman’s infertility should
weigh in her favor. If Mary Sue was able to have a genetic child without the pre-embryos
and was not emotionally attached, the balance would still weigh in her favor due to the
physical harms incurred from the initial procedures. In this scenario, unless Mary Sue
exhibited no hesitations or interest in whether Junior had decision making over the preembryos, the circumstances would weigh in her favor.
Under this modified balancing test, Junior would likely only prevail if his interest
overwhelmingly outweighed Mary Sue’s, such as if he was completely sterile, and Mary
Sue was able to easily become pregnant without the pre-embryos and had no emotional
attachment to the pre-embryos. If Junior wanted to use the pre-embryos with a new partner
and Mary Sue wanted to preserve them for future use, the balancing test might more likely
weigh in Junior’s favor if he was sterile and the pre-embryos were his only chance at
genetic parenthood. However, the court would have to balance Junior’s infertility with
Mary Sue’s contributed sweat equity, emotional attachment to the pre-embryos, and her
ability to become pregnant without the pre-embryos. Applying the factors of the modified
balancing test reveals that sex and gender differences are deeply ingrained in IVF disputes.
These factors will force courts to consider dichotomies in cis-heterosexual couples and
ultimately come to a more accurate balance of each couple’s interests.
This modified balancing test is not a new concept. As previously discussed, courts
already apply a balancing test, whether implicit or explicit, often inherently favoring one
position over the other.129 However, courts do not always acknowledge these balancing
tests. Instead, courts should make their balancing explicit and focus on specific interests,
thereby mitigating broad discretion to weigh any factors they see fit. As discussed in Part
I, sex and gender difference matters. Women contribute substantial physical sweat equity
129
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that far outweighs any physical burden men undergo as part of the IVF process.130 Women
have fewer years of fertility than men,131 and lose precious time during unsuccessful IVF
procedures. Further, women by and large have a different relationship to parenthood—
women have a harder time disengaging from parenthood,132 women have different physical
constraints due to pregnancy and breastfeeding that create a dependency relationship,133
and women, generally, are sociologically predisposed or expected to be the primary
caretaker.134 The circumstances relating to IVF procedures, pregnancy, and relational
parenting create disparate experiences for women and men. Thus, courts should reflect
these disparities by affording significant and due weight to women’s interest in resolving
IVF disputes. In practice, I predict this method will favor women’s interests in such
disputes across the board.
C. Towards a Regime We Have Already Seen
Recognition of women’s special interest in family law issues is not a novel concept.
In fact, several examples recognize inherent sex and gender differences in establishing
rules. For instance, Illinois law establishes: “In the absence of an explicit order or judgment
for the allocation of parental responsibilities, the establishment of a child support obligation
or the allocation of parenting time to one parent shall be construed as an order or judgment
allocating all parental responsibilities to the other parent.”135 In the absence of parenting
provisions in such an order or judgment, “all parental responsibilities shall be presumed to
be allocated to the mother” unless the child primarily resided with the other parent for the
prior six months.136
In Lehr v. Robertson, a putative father claimed that the adoption of his biological
child without his consent violated his constitutional due process rights.137 The Supreme
Court wrote that mere biological connection between a child and a man does not establish
a constitutional right that automatically compels the state to listen to his opinion on the
child’s best interest.138 Rather, “[m]en need to have developed an actual relationship with
a child, in addition to a biological connection, before their constitutional right to parent

130

See Jacobson, Zieve, & Conaway, supra note 39.
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine reports “a healthy, fertile 30-year-old woman has a
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FOR REPROD. MED., AGE AND FERTILITY: A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS 4 (2012),
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ripens.”139 By contrast, Forman observed, “women's full constitutional parental identity
and rights attach upon giving birth.”140
These rules are important because they recognize times when the law requires
evaluating different sex and gender-based experiences to provide equitable solutions. Even
so, my proposal is not nearly as stringent as providing a bright-line default rule. Rather, I
propose a framework that more accurately reflects sex and gender differences. With this in
mind, a modified balancing test that considers interests and gives particular weight to one
gender over another is not in fact radical, but achievable and noteworthy for equitable
treatment in family law.
D. Constitutional Considerations for IVF Disputes and Considering Sex and Gender
Differences
This Note implicates two primary constitutional concerns. First, critics may argue
the proposed balancing test violates Equal Protection because it has a disparate impact on
men. However, the test circumvents Equal Protection requirements because the disparate
impact therein does not stem from discriminatory intent. Alternatively, critics may argue
that a constitutional analysis framing IVF as a fundamental right jeopardizes abortion rights
because the right to use pre-embryos and the right to abortion have conflicting stances on
forced genetic parenthood. This argument is substantively null after the Dobbs decision,
which terminated abortion as a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.141 However, even in states that choose not to terminate the right to abortion,
IVF disputes and abortion are fundamentally distinct, and are treated as such in the law.
At first glance, asking courts to consider sex and gender seems to run afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause. However, this concern is without merit because the test favors
women based on legitimate interests, not discriminatory intent. That this test may have a
disparate impact to increase favorable outcomes for women does not invalidate the test on
Equal Protection grounds alone.142 For a disparate impact claim to prevail under Equal
Protection, the challenged practice must stem from a discriminatory intent. 143 Whereas
some feminist legal scholars support judicial deference for women144—and might similarly
support such deference in a statute—I do not propose a default rule for women to prevail.

Id. (“[T]he existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between parent and child is a relevant
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The modified balancing test neither directs courts to rule in favor of women nor does
it ask courts to be searching in making their determinations. By its nature, a balancing test
weighs differences between parties to evaluate who should prevail. Up until this point,
however, courts have been permitted to ignore related interests in their balancing, such as
crucial differences stemming from sex and gender, that dramatically change each person’s
experience with IVF. This proposed test acknowledges sex and gender as part of IVF
disputes and accordingly incorporates these concomitant interests in judicial consideration.
Consequently, this test does not favor women because of discriminatory intent, but because
it pushes courts to give commensurate weight to relevant interests in IVF disputes.
Although Dobbs changes the constitutional analysis, abortion and IVF are distinct
issues. Abortion primarily implicates a person already pregnant choosing either to
terminate or continue the pregnancy. IVF, on the other hand, implicates someone who
wants to use pre-embryos for pregnancy and frequently involves at least one person who
has fertility issues. Notwithstanding important differences that should preclude applying
across-the-board analyses for these reproductive issues, Dobbs blurs the distinctions
between decision making for IVF and abortion.
Before Dobbs, a constitutional analysis that supported a “right to procreate, . . .
include[d] the right not to procreate.”145 Post-Dobbs, instead of balancing “whether one
party’s fundamental right to procreate is more or less significant than the other party’s right
not to procreate,”146 courts may find the constitutional question of fundamental rights
irrelevant. In fact, Dobbs may strengthen parties’ arguments that advocate to use preembryos over the other’s objection in state courts. If abortion, IVF, and reproductive rights
are no longer protected as fundamental rights,147 those issues are no longer subject to
constitutional considerations.
If, for argument’s sake, abortion was still considered a federal fundamental right, the
constitutional analyses for abortion and IVF could mirror each other. Both issues,
proscribing abortion and using pre-embryos over someone’s objection, concern making
someone a genetic parent without consent.148 Assuming Junior Davis’s ability to father a
genetic child remains unchanged, situating Mary Sue’s right to procreate as a fundamental
right would give her significant weight to use the pre-embryos if they were her last chance
at genetic parenthood. This analysis would similarly afford her significant weight in
preventing Junior from using the pre-embryos with a different woman.
However, since abortion is not a federal fundamental right,149 any challenge to preembryo use on the grounds that forced genetic parenthood is manifestly against public
policy holds little weight. Important to the Reber court’s decision, Sarah Holman Loy
145
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wrote, “forced [genetic] parenthood, at least when a spouse cannot procreate through other
means, is not against public policy,”150 a position supported by Dobbs.151 In the absence of
a universal public policy against forced parenthood in the specific context of pre-embryo
implantation over a party’s objection,152 such reasoning should not factor into IVF dispute
resolution.
Finally, a constitutional analysis for IVF and abortion providing a “right to procreate,
. . . [which] includes the right not to procreate”153 centers on the people who could become
parents, not on the pre-embryos or fetuses. Previously, the Supreme Court determined that
“fetuses, which are more developed than . . . embryos, have no constitutional protections
as persons, so why would the embryos?”154 However, post-Dobbs, states may very well
afford fundamental rights to pre-embryos or fetuses themselves. With a precarious future
in federal courts and across state jurisdictions, there are not yet universal rulings either
reconciling Dobbs and IVF or defining “persons” with a Fourteenth Amendment right to
life to include frozen, undeveloped, un-transplanted pre-embryos.155 Until it becomes clear
whether pre-embryos have such protections, discussions about pre-embryos should
continue to center on the people who could become parents.
CONCLUSION
Courts recognize IVF disputes are quintessentially personal issues and yet make
these intimate decisions for couples anyway. Courts should not hold unfettered discretion
to choose which factors determine whether someone is entitled to decision-making
authority over their pre-embryos. Since courts already apply balancing tests to resolve IVF
disputes, whether implicitly or explicitly, they should do so explicitly and should do so in
a manner that fairly and commensurately gives weight to women’s interests. Establishing
a regime that gives commensurate weight to women’s sex and gender differences sets a
foundation for considering women’s unique experiences throughout family law and related
gendered areas of the law.
For cis-heterosexual couples, sex and gender are impossible to separate from IVF
procedures, pregnancy, and parenthood. Rather than focusing on a gender-neutral
framework, we should acknowledge that sex and gender are part of the conversation and
make their roles explicit, thereby pushing courts to equitably address those imbalances
head on.
IVF disputes can dramatically change someone’s life: they are the difference
between becoming a parent and not becoming a parent, between utility and futility for
invasive medical procedures, and determine agency for certain reproductive autonomy. As
a deeply gendered issue, IVF disputes present an opportunity for family law to make
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amends for social harms perpetuating gender inequity. Making amends requires defining
weights for balancing gendered interests in IVF to establish a regime that accurately and
effectively reflects women’s interests in these disputes.
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